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to me. The author(s) criticize(s) contingency theory as "functional 
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abstract and the start of the sector on research methodology (p. 7) 
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model and Figure 1 clearly resemble contingency theoretical thinking, 
but are introduced without anchoring in any theoretical tradition, while 
a critical lens is completely absent. The author(s) need to outline 
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2) Research Question 
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This made me expect a focus on processes and/or mechanisms that 
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Miller, 2016; Oakes and Oakes, 2016; Ellwood & 
Greenwood, 2016; Oakes, Townley and Cooper 1998; 
Townley, Cooper and Oakes, 2003) to enable us 
contribute to  Otley’s descriptive framework (Otley, 1999; 
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concerned to find an optimal fit by developing and testing 
hypotheses (Donaldson, 2001). However, we use figure 
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highlighted in the literature (e.g. ter Bogt and Tillema, 
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discussion.  
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4) Findings 
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5) Discussion 
The discussion is currently more a summary than a discussion. The 
few lines on power relationships are speculative - things that may 
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framework and the findings. 
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Oakes, and Cooper in arts organizations (e.g. ASQ 1998 or 
research question to focus on: how national arts 
organisations manage their performance in the pursuit of 
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influences? We have focused our findings and 
discussion on these influences, and supported our 
discussion by drawing on relevant literature.  
 
3) We appreciate your suggestion to delete the table 1 to 
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stories emerging in our findings and streamline the 
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Abstract 
 
 
This study provides insight into how two national arts organisations located in London 
manage their performance in the pursuit of heterogenous objectives, within the confines of 
external influences. These organisations significantly rely on the government for funding 
and are therefore required to implement policy initiatives, albeit at arm’s length from the 
government. Performance management systems (PMSs) were primarily designed to enable 
trustees discharge their statutory duties of collecting, preserving, and displaying objects and 
works of arts, which were reflected in a management agreement containing the 
government’s strategic priorities.  The findings show that the changing politico-economic 
climate has subtly started to change values, accountability relationships and realities in the 
field of arts and culture. Whilst arts organisations emphasised socio-cultural objectives in 
strategic planning and operational processes, external pressures arising from austerity has 
subtly started to displace socio-cultural values. Business language, vocabularies, and tools 
commonly used in the private sector are insidiously taking roots in arts organisations. 
Austerity provided a signal to executives that the survival of their core activities was at 
stake and, they have to engage in income generating activities to support their core 
activities.  
 
 
 
Keywords: Performance management; control; museums; art galleries; austerity. 
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1. Introduction 
Arts organisations play an important role in the implementation of the politico-economic 
and socio-cultural priorities of governments in civilised societies (Foucault, 2009). As such, 
in many countries they are primarily funded from public funding which in turn creates 
accountability expectations from governments who have to demonstrate value for money 
(ter Bogt & Tillema, 2016; Zan, Baraldi, Ferri, Lusiani, & Mariani, 2012). In line with the 
new public management (NPM) ideology of distancing government’s political decisions 
from service delivery (Hood, 1995), national arts organisations in the UK are organised as 
non-departmental public bodies (NDPB) to enable them carry out activities at arm’s length 
from the government, although they are accountable for implementing policy initiatives.  
Private sector management practices have been introduced in the arts sector, under the 
banner of NPM because of the perceived superiority of market-based economic principles 
(Hellstrom & Lapsley, 2016; Hood, 1995). However, prior studies have found that the 
imposition of economic rationality and the act of measuring or managing of the arts by 
numbers can have real, and often perverse, consequences, such as short-termism - the 
disposal of major heritage assets and collections leading to a loss in cultural value (Ellwood 
& Greenwood, 2016),   and focussing on getting done what gets measured  (Crepaz, Huber, 
& Scheytt, 2016). Whilst performance management systems (PMSs) aim to provide 
rationalisation in the form of justification of actions and make explicit means-ends 
relationships, there may be frustration when implementing PMSs in practice  (Townley, 
Cooper, & Oakes, 2003), because of differences in language, translation, interpretation and 
fit with existing culture, leading to divergence and sedimentation (Ferri & Zan, 2014; 
Hyndman, et al., 2014).  Moreover, the adoption of context specific strategies by different 
types of organisations may lead to different configurations, implementations, and usages of 
PMSs (Quattrone & Hopper, 2005).  
This study examines how national arts organisations manage their performance in the 
pursuit of heterogenous objectives, within the confines of external influences. It highlights 
the power of structures, pressures and constraints in influencing organisational practices and 
values. It draws on Ferreira & Otley’s (2009) extended framework for performance 
management and adds external influences discussed in the critical accounting literature 
(Jeacle & Miller, 2016; Oakes , Townley, & Cooper, 1998; ter Bogt & Tillema, 2016) to 
frame our analysis of external pressures and constraints influencing performance 
management practices. It makes a theoretical contribution to the functional (Chenhall, 2003) 
and descriptive (Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Otley, 1999) methodological approaches adopted in 
prior performance management studies, by adopting a critical methodology which is helpful 
in providing insights into interests that underlie relationships (Broadbent, 2002).  
At the empirical level, this study illustrates how a PMS in a hybrid public sector and 
charity setting operates, highlights the power of governance technologies (e.g. management 
agreement with the government, strategic and business plans, and performance reporting) in 
transcending organisational and departmental boundaries to shape values, and discusses 
some of the implications of austerity in arts sector. This study is mainly based on data 
collected from published sources and interviews conducted with senior executives of a 
national museum and a national arts gallery located in London. These two arts organisations 
“are important centres for scholarship and research, as well as being hugely popular visitor 
attractions”, and are ranked in the top 10  leading visitor attractions in the UK (ALVA, 
2016; HM Government, 2016, p. 2).  
This paper is organised as follows. The next section draws on the performance 
management literature to provide a framework for grounding the empirical analysis of 
performance management practices in arts organisations. The third section explains this 
study’s research methods. The fourth section presents the empirical findings in relation to 
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the PMS discussed in the second section. The final section provides some discussion and 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. The performance management of arts organisations 
The pervasive use of private sector management practices in arts organisations has prompted 
researchers to suggest that these practices have colonised the lifeworlds of arts and culture 
(Oakes & Oakes, 2016). For example, the deployment of investment appraisal techniques 
(Mikes & Morhart, 2017), business planning models (Oakes , et al., 1998) and economic 
value measurement systems (Ellwood & Greenwood, 2016) makes certain things visible and 
others less visible although the latter may be as important, if not more important. This 
section provides an overview of private sector performance management techniques which 
may be used to manage arts organisations and draws on the critical literature to highlight the 
issues that are specifically relevant to managing arts organisations to provide a framework 
for analysing our findings. 
The balanced scorecard (Kaplan & Norton, 2001), which links financial (i.e. 
shareholder) to non-financial performance perspectives (i.e. customer, internal business 
processes, and learning and innovation) in terms of cause and effect, has been universally 
applied in private, public and not for profit sectors to clarify, communicate and manage 
strategies. In a report commissioned by the Arts Council England, Royce (2011) argued that 
an arts organisation should have a sound business model, similar to the balanced scorecard 
to be successful beyond the short term. More specifically, “it must be attractive to a range of 
co-investors (funders, donors, customers/visitors, staff, artists and other arts organisations); 
it must be agile: able to innovate and both to initiate and respond to change, in strategic and 
thoughtful fashion; it must be able to achieve its goals and to execute its strategy in cost-
efficient and effective ways; and it must also be well-led, well-managed and have a strong 
and appropriate organisational culture, which aligns and supports its mission and values” 
(pp. 14-15). However, the relevance of this proposed PMS may be questioned because it 
primarily focuses on economic rationality and internal processes and is unable to effectively 
explain complexities and vested interests that underlie strategic planning and 
implementation processes (Norreklit, 2000). Even if performance can be defined from the 
perspectives of relevant stakeholders, the causality between performance measures and 
results may be difficult to ascertain in some sectors because of opacities, uncertainties and 
flaws (Dambrin & Robson, 2011).  
Contingency theory suggests that there is no universal PMS that can fit all 
organisations. According to Donaldson (2001, p. 1), the “essence of the contingency theory 
paradigm is that organizational effectiveness results from fitting characteristics of the 
organization, such as its structure, to contingencies that reflect the situation of the 
organization”. To improve performance, organisations are motivated to continually change 
(their structure and strategies) in response to changes in their contingencies to obtain an 
optimal fit. The major independent variables in the external environment and within the 
organisational boundary that were found to have a relationship with the dependent variables 
of performance include culture, competition, technology, uncertainties, organisational size, 
structure, strategy and compensation (Chenhall, 2003; Otley, 2016). In a comprehensive 
review of the contingency theory literature, Otley (2016, p. 45) interestingly commented 
that “all research on these topics has to take a ‘contingency’ approach as it becomes 
recognized that universal solutions to problems in organizational control generally do not 
exist”. However, Otley (2016, p.45 & 48) found that most contingency studies have 
neglected qualitative non-financial variables, and as such he cautions that the adoption of a 
functional and “mechanistic approach that will develop into a predictive mechanism for the 
design of optimal control systems is misguided” and recommends future studies to deploy 
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“a much wider range of research approaches”. That is, the modelling, systematic measuring 
and testing of correlations and causality among performance variables by the inclusion of 
control variables, similar to controlled observations and experimentations carried out in the 
natural sciences, may not be appropriate in settings where they are complex influences, 
uncertainties and uncontrollable variables that are difficult to quantify. 
Ferreira and Otley (2009, p. 263) developed an extended PMS by elaborating on and 
adding to the performance perspectives in Otley’s (1999) to provide “a research tool for 
describing the structure and operation of performance management systems (PMSs) in a 
more holistic manner”.  However, Ferreira and Otley (2009, p. 267) acknowledge that they 
have not included external contextual factors, which they view “as contingent variables that 
might explain why certain patterns of control are more or less effective, rather than 
characteristics of the control system that need to be incorporated into a description.” Neely, 
Adams, and Kennerley (2002) provide complementary insights into the role of external 
influence. They suggest that organisations are more likely to prosper and survive in the long 
term if they adopt a stakeholder centred approach when designing PMSs. They propose a 
comprehensive and integrated performance management prism that requires managers to 
think about stakeholders’ expectations (who are the stakeholders and what do they want and 
need?), and stakeholders’ contributions’ (what does the organisation want and need from its 
stakeholders?).  
Core dimensions of performance (i.e.  mission and vision, structure, critical success 
factors, strategic planning and implementation, performance measurement and evaluation, 
and consequences) are of primary concern to members working within the organisation’s 
boundary (Otley, 1999) – See figure 1. The vision statement is expected to succinctly and 
inspirationally clarify where an organisation wants to be in the future, whilst the mission 
statement is expected to explain why and for what purposes an organisation exists and how 
it intends to progress towards achieving its vision. Critical success factors are the activities 
that an organisation is expected to carry out and are the pre-requisites for progressing 
towards the achievement of organisational vision (De Vasconcellos, Sousa, & Hambrick, 
1989). Information flows from internal and external sources form the basis for performance 
evaluation. The information flows may lead to change in strategic objectives and directions, 
depending on whether they are being used as single loop learning (i.e. treating objectives 
and strategies as fixed or given) or double loop learning (i.e. changing objectives and 
strategies in response to internal and external stimulus). Ferreira and Otley (2009) included 
the dimensions of PMS use and change, and coherence and intensity of relationships to 
provide a second level of analysis, because they pervade across the core performance 
dimensions at the centre of the diagram. The interactive use of PMS  to discuss strategic and 
operational issues and the diagnostic  use of PMS to trouble-shoot problems may lead to 
fine-tuning, refinements and changes of the core performance dimensions (Simons, 1995). 
Figure 1 adds external influences that are relevant for understanding performance 
management of arts organisations (Ellwood & Greenwood, 2016; Jeacle & Miller, 2016; 
Oakes & Oakes, 2016; Oakes , et al., 1998; ter Bogt & Tillema, 2016; Townley, et al., 
2003). The purpose of this skeletal framework (Laughlin, 1995) is to illustrate the interests 
that are embedded in PMSs of arts organisations when pursuing politico-economic and 
socio-cultural objectives. As Oakes , et al. (1998, p. 277) found, the conception of PMS as 
“mere acts of technical transcription concealed the force this process involved” in directing 
“attention away from the shifting of cultural capital toward economic capital and the 
diminution of existing identities”. The autonomy of an organisation to pursue strategic 
actions, and its ability to define boundaries within a particular field depend on the economic, 
social, and cultural capitals that it possesses (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). 
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Figure 1: A performance management framework for arts organisations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Feedback & feedforward learning loops: information flows and interactions. 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Chenhall (2003); Ferreira and Otley (2009); Kaplan and Norton (2001); 
Neely, et al. (2002) 
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Prior critical accounting studies have provided insights into the influences that drive socio-
cultural and politico-economic objectives of arts organisations  (Ellwood & Greenwood, 
2016; Zan, Blackstock, Cerutti, & Mayer, 2000) and highlighted the “challenges in 
managing the arts, in particular the delicate balancing of the possible tensions between 
creativity and economic constraint” (Jeacle & Miller, 2016, p. 1). In the context of arts 
organisations in Alberta, Oakes , et al. (1998, p. 258) consider the discourses of “power as 
central to understanding how control works in modern society and organizations”. These 
authors argue that organisational planning and control systems provide sanctions to 
legitimise influential discourses (of managers and their external constituents), and serve as a 
mechanism for producing pedagogical knowledge and understanding of an organisation and 
its activities.  
The adoption of private sector calculative practices in the arts sector may have real 
consequences, beyond the phenomena being measured or valued (Hines, 1988) because the 
act of adoption has the potential to significantly influence core values and identities (Oakes , 
et al., 1998). Whilst accounting technologies provide the conceptual tools for decision 
making (such as recognising the economic reality of a transaction, an activity or an asset), 
they only paint a partial picture that matters for a particular purpose and from a particular 
perspective e.g. decision usefulness for investors, in contrast to accountability for future 
generations. For example, Oakes and Oakes (2016) found that the lifeworld of arts 
organisations which were mainly funded by Arts Council England was partly corrupted by 
accounting and commercial values. Managers were apparently aware of the inadequacy of 
numbers in capturing the full value of arts but nevertheless “played out the charade of 
advocacy and legitimacy, claiming to demonstrate impact when they knew the essence of 
the arts is always out of reach” (p. 50). They call for future studies to “develop further 
understanding of the management of austerity and funding constraints in arts organisations” 
(p. 50).  
Ellwood and Greenwood (2016) examined the challenges and consequences of the 
attempt by government and accounting standard setters to pressure arts organisations to 
recognise the economic value of their heritage assets. Arts organisations resisted pressures 
to place economic values on their collections because the determination of economic value 
is fraught with ambiguities, the measurement and preservation of economic value may result 
in the disposal of historically and culturally significant collections, and recognition of assets 
paints a picture of affluence which may affect funding from potential donors.  
In contrast, Mikes and Morhart (2017, p. 67) argued that accounting can play a 
catalysing role by “transforming a niche cultural project into a commercially viable popular 
culture product, while enhancing – rather than violating – the project’s artistic authenticity.” 
In the context of the Netherlands, ter Bogt and Tillema (2016) found that accounting 
fostered trust between theatres and the municipalities and mediated the tensions between 
conflicting creativity and control objectives. They “show that, despite the formal picture set 
out in performance agreements and accounting documents, the control relationship between 
theatres and municipalities might appear to be very ‘loose’ and informal in practice.” (p. 6). 
They argue that trust and relational controls play an important role in complementing formal 
accounting controls in relationships, especially when organisations are faced with multiple 
objectives and when performance is difficult to define and measure.  
The next section explains how data has been collected and analysed for the purpose of 
this study. 
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3. Research methods  
This study draws on interviews conducted with participants involved in the PMS of a 
national museum and a national arts gallery located in London, and on information that are 
in the public domain.   
Prior to conducting interviews, we analysed documents from secondary sources to 
engage in informed and meaningful discussion with the interviewees. More specifically, we 
analysed Acts of Parliament and management agreements, because PMSs are expected to 
enable trustees and museum directors discharge their statutory duties and deliver on the 
government’s priorities specified in these documents  (Oakes , et al., 1998). We also 
analysed the strategic plans, annual reports, key performance indicators, and minutes of 
meetings to understand how trustees and executives respond to external influences. When 
analysing these documents, we paid particular attention to issues pertaining to: socio-
cultural and politico-economic themes and priorities, governance structures, and 
accountability relationships. We also visited the museum and arts gallery prior to 
conducting the interviews to understand the socio-cultural activities they undertake, 
collections they have on display, and commercial and non-commercial facilities they 
provide to visitors. 
A total of twenty-one face-to-face interviews were conducted with trustees and 
executive directors who had substantial experience and knowledge of performance 
management issues and challenges facing the arts sector. These individuals were passionate 
about the world of arts and cultural policies, and played an important role in balancing 
socio-cultural imperatives and politico-economic constraints (Oakes & Oakes, 2016; ter 
Bogt & Tillema, 2016). Sixteen interviews were conducted with trustees and executive 
directors from the two arts organisations – the contact details of these interviewees were 
available in the minutes of meetings of the arts organisations which are publicly available on 
their webpages.   Five interviews were conducted with directors from the Department for 
Digital, Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS) and non-government sponsors – the contact details 
of these interviewees were provided by the trustees and executive directors of the arts 
organisations who regularly interacted with them.  
The core dimensions of performance, challenges posed by austerity, and responses to 
pressures were discursively apprehended during the interviews which were semi-structured 
in nature (Townley, et al., 2003). The following questions were asked guide the interviews: 
What are the objectives of your organisation? What are the roles of the trustees and 
executives and how do they interface with relevant interest groups? How is performance 
managed? By who, through what processes, and what areas are particularly emphasised? 
How effective are performance management processes and measures in terms of achieving 
objectives? What constraints, pressures and challenges does your organisation face, and how 
does it respond to them?  
To enable candid replies, interviewees were informed that their names would not be 
disclosed when writing the findings, but were cautioned that the name of the organisation 
may be identifiable as this study also uses information in their annual reports and strategic 
plans which are in the public domain. They were also informed they could withdraw from 
the interview process at any time and, make any comment off the record. All interviewees 
consented in writing to participate in the study, verbally consented to be recorded, and did 
not express concern that the name of their organisation may be identified. The interviews 
lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. The recordings were immediately transcribed by one of 
the researchers after the interviews to enable accurate recall of issues discussed (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). The transcripts were also checked for accuracy by another researcher. 
All the transcripts were read and analysed in relation to themes that have been 
highlighted in the performance management literature, discourses in policy and regulatory 
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documents, corporate plans and annual reports, to identify pertinent and contentious issues 
and to frame this study’s findings. This process requires reflexivity and acknowledgement 
of the researchers’ own interests (e.g. arising from the choice of a particular paradigm or 
theoretical framework) and position they occupy in the intellectual field (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992; Said, 1994) – i.e. in the communication of a particular reality, we may be 
complicit in constructing that reality (Hines, 1988). The objective of this study is not to 
generalise, but to provide insights into performance management issues and challenges 
faced by the two arts organisations studied which may resonate with experiences in other 
settings (Berry & Otley, 2004).  
 
 
4. Findings: The performance management of arts organisations 
The findings are presented in relation to the inter-related dimensions of performance 
discussed in the literature. External influences are discussed first, as these drive performance 
management processes within arts organisations. 
 
External structural influences driving organisational objectives 
Both the museum and the arts gallery are well established organisations – they were 
officially opened in the mid and late nineteenth century respectively. Their governance 
structure, within which they pursue their socio-cultural and politico-economic objectives, is 
quite complex. Although they are organised as non-departmental public body (NDPB) to 
enable their executives carry out activities at arm’s length from the government, they 
contribute towards the performance objectives of DCMS in return for the public funding 
they receive. They are also exempt charities under Schedule 3 of the Charities Act 2011, 
meaning that the DCMS is their principal regulator for charity law purposes. This regulatory 
framework partly drives the mission, objectives and activities, as stated in the annual report 
of the museum: “During 2016–17 the Board of Trustees of the Science Museum (the SMG 
Board) agreed a new vision and mission for SMG…which takes due regard of the Charity 
Commission’s general guidance on public benefit and informs all decision-making, future 
planning and strategic priorities” (National Audit Office, 2017, p. 5).  
The statutory duties of the trustees are specified in the National Heritage Act 1983 
and the Museums and Galleries Act 1992, which state that they are responsible to: (a) care 
for, preserve and add to the works of arts in their collection; (b) secure the works of arts 
exhibited to the public; (c) make the works of arts and documents available to persons 
seeking to inspect them in connection with study or research; and (d) generally promote the 
public’s enjoyment and understanding of arts. The trustees are also politically accountable 
to the ministers (from DCMS and the Cabinet Office) who are responsible for appointing 
them on the board of national museums and arts galleries, although “the recruitment of 
Trustees takes place in accordance with the procedures defined by DCMS and the Office of 
the Commissioner for Public Appointments” (National Audit Office, 2017, p. 41). The 
government controls the criteria for making senior appointments, such as the desirability of 
candidates possessing specialised knowledge about arts, culture, history and collections, and 
commercial knowledge about fundraising, and income generation, and thus indirectly plays 
a role in embedding values at the strategic level in arts organisations. 
The arts organisations engaged in fundraising and commercial activities to supplement 
their funding from government and charitable sources, which may create conflict among 
objectives. Table 1 shows their funding structure in 2007 and 2017, and highlights the 
impact of the government’s austerity agenda that began in 2010. Although government 
funding for the museum has increased in nominal terms from £37m to £41, a director of 
finance from the museum explained that this has declined in real terms and that the rate of 
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increase in their unavoidable costs, which are mostly fixed, was greater than the rate of 
inflation:   
 
Government funding has fallen by more than 25% in real terms between 2010 and 
now, and next year it will fall. Our funding was cut for 2015-16. So we would have to 
find additional funding to make up the difference or cut expenditure to reflect that. We 
are an organisation that has very high fixed costs - all of these buildings to maintain 
and collections to look after. Lots of our costs are unavoidable. Costs have gone up 
far faster than the rate of inflation, and yet our funding is falling. 
 
Table 1: Sources of funding 
 Museum Arts gallery 
 2007 2017 2007 2017 
 £000 % £000 % £000 % £000 % 
Government (DCMS) 36,697  75% 40,934 59%  7,031  44% 6,637 35% 
Non-government:         
   Donations  5,258  11% 6,125 9%  2,788  17% 4,213 22% 
   Charitable income  747  2% 10,865 16%  2,622  16% 4,250 22% 
   Trading & investment  3,376  7% 9,783 14%  3,448  22% 3,803 20% 
   Other  2,741  6% 2,200 3%  138  1% 271 1% 
Total non-government 12,122 25% 28,973 41% 8,996 56% 12,537 65% 
Total income 48,819  100% 69,907 100% 16,027  100% 19,174 100% 
Source: Annual reports (2007 and 2017). 
 
The proportion of non-government funding as a percentage of total funding in 2007 to 2017 
has increased for both arts organisations, which can potentially change accountability 
relationships because reliance on funding is a source of influence (ter Bogt & Tillema, 
2016). It is interesting to note that interviewees from the arts gallery pointed out that they 
wanted greater control of the funds they raised from other sources - the total funding for the 
arts gallery was about 65%, as compared to the museum which was 41% in 2017. However, 
a principal curator from the museum highlighted that placing greater reliance on non-
government funding may influence the values of arts organisations: 
 
Donors have too many restrictions – we don’t want to touch them. If they want to get 
their names on the main hall, that is fine, but we don’t want to be driven by donors. I 
am very concerned if the government funding goes down, because we would have to 
heavily rely on the donors. This would then affect the political drivers and political 
culture of the museum. 
 
Whilst austerity has pressured arts organisations to raise income from non-government 
sources, the financial crisis has taken its toll on non-government funding. This has led to 
stiff competition among arts organisations from a declining pool of funding. As commented 
by a deputy CEO from the arts gallery:  
 
Winning donations from benefactors is an uphill struggle, even for the most adept of 
fundraisers. Charitable donations to arts and culture were down by about 20 per cent 
last year. 
 
In summary, PMSs are expected to enable arts organisations discharge their statutory duties 
and meet the accountability expectations of their funders and themselves. 
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Vision, mission, organisation, and critical success factors 
Arts organisations operate within the confines of statutory, government and economic 
influences. The vision and mission reflected their core values which were primarily geared 
towards the pursuit of socio-cultural objectives. For example, both organisations articulated 
their vision and mission in their annual reports and corporate plans as follows: ‘building a 
scientifically literate society’, ‘inspire next generations of scientists, inventors and 
engineers’, and ‘promote through the medium of portraits the appreciation and 
understanding of the men and women who have made and are making British history and 
culture’. Whilst interviewees were generally enthusiastic to talk about the socio-cultural 
objectives of their organisation, they highlighted that the pursuit of these objectives were 
influenced by resources and administrative constraints imposed by their funders.  
The mission and vision, which featured in official documents such as annual reports 
and strategic plans, played a pedagogic role in communicating the values of senior 
management (Oakes , et al., 1998).  They were aimed at enabling trustees discharge their 
statutory responsibilities, and enabling the museum director discharge her/his ‘personal 
accountability’ to the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sports (i.e. the minister in 
charge of DCMS) for safeguarding public funds.  A director of development from the 
museum explained the accountability structure as follows: 
 
Trustees and the chair of the board of trustees are appointed by DCMS. Our museum 
director who is the chief executive of the group, is appointed by the prime minister… I 
report to a finance and general purpose sub-committee of the board of trustees, and to 
the board of trustees on a quarterly basis on income. I attended these meetings to 
explain fund-raising performance, and compliance with ethics policy: who are we 
getting money from, why, and for what purpose? 
 
In return for the funding provided by DCMS, the chair of the board of trustee and museum 
director were required to sign a management agreement with the Secretary of State for 
Culture, Media and Sport. The Secretary of State explicitly highlighted her financial 
priorities for the arts organisation by stating that it should ‘continue to pursue commercial 
and philanthropic approaches to generating revenue which will complement grant-in aid’ 
but couched her socio-cultural priorities in broad terms by stating that it should ‘ensure that 
free entry to the permanent collections would be made available’, and ‘protect world-class 
collections and front-line services’ (DCMS, 2017a). 
Whilst the government’s socio-cultural priorities were loosely specified in the 
management agreement (i.e. one page), administrative matters were quite comprehensively 
covered (i.e. 30 pages). Financial and administrative matters relating to governance and 
performance that were covered in greater depth include: financial management, duties to 
deliver on the strategic priorities of DCMS, broad performance objectives of the arts 
organisation in relation to statues and the implementation of public policies, risk 
management and internal control procedures, procurement, accounting information to be 
disclosed and reported to DCMS, formal review meetings with DCMS, and responsibilities 
of the parties to the agreement.  
As compared to the formal relationship between arts organisations and the 
government, the relationship with non-government funders depended on the size of the 
funding and purpose for which funding was provided. The agreement ranged “from a strong 
legal contract with major corporate donors, to a purely verbal philanthropic agreement 
with trusts and foundations” (Director, arts gallery).  When undertaking projects, museum 
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and the arts gallery met their non-government funders’ socio-cultural priorities whilst 
simultaneously fulfilling their duties to DCMS. Project-specific success factors were 
identified for subsequent monitoring and evaluation.  As stated by the director of 
development from the museum: 
 
You have to set up project objectives for the project and meet sponsors’ priorities, but 
you have to meet the government’s priorities as well. Sponsors monitor the project 
quite closely; you will need to meet them very regularly. You would have to 
demonstrate that you have used the fund to meet objectives, and to evaluate 
achievement of objectives afterwards. 
 
In summary, the core values in the vision and mission of arts organisation, which provide 
the framework for strategic planning and reporting to relevant authorities, reflect the 
statutory duties of senior management.  
 
Strategic planning and implementation 
The long-term strategic and short-term business plans played a pedagogic role in terms of 
providing departments, teams and individuals with a planning and control tool that would 
subsequently be used to assess their contributions to organisational objectives (Oakes , et al., 
1998). In this respect, the chairman of board of trustees and the museum director stated that 
the strategic planning “document captures the top-level long-term priorities and is to be used 
actively as a touchstone for decision-making throughout the next decade or so” (Museum, 
2017, p. 38). 
Arts organisations distinguished between ‘core’ and ‘support’ values to differentiate 
the values that mattered most to them. Whilst both organisations placed significant emphasis 
on their socio-cultural objectives (e.g. inspire people, create knowledge, increase audience 
and sustain growth of collections) which they termed ‘core’ priorities, they also 
acknowledged the importance of ‘support’ priorities such as the generation of income. In 
response to funding pressures, the museum stated that by 2030 “it will be an exemplar 
among museums for commercial activity and entrepreneurship” (Museum, 2017, p. 36).  
The interviewees generally identified themselves with the socio-cultural values 
espoused in the management agreement, and in the strategic plans. However, they also 
acknowledged the importance of income generating activities in supporting core values, 
such as introducing special paid exhibits, new products or service, and trading in coffee and 
gift shops. For example, a director of public engagement from the museum broadly 
highlighted these values as follows: 
 
Our strategic plan reflects the history of the museum what we choose to focus and how 
we want to position the museum in the next ten years, how we want to be perceived by 
our stakeholders, the funding environment, and the needs of the stakeholders who 
provide us with funding in particular, but all these things are very much related. 
Fundamentally the strategic plan is a bold statement about who we are, why we 
matter, what we intend to do, but it is written with a view to securing funding for the 
organisation because we need to raise money to do what we want to do. 
 
The different components of the strategic plan were ‘owned’ by directors and their heads of 
departments, denoting segregation of duties and responsibilities in the pursuit of different, 
but related, objectives. For example, the curators were concerned with issues related to 
collections, whilst the directors of engagement were concerned with the profile of audience, 
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and the commercial task force was interested in income generating activities. As explained 
by a director of public engagement from the art gallery: 
 
The strategic plan for public engagement strategy group, which I chair and am 
responsible for, is written in collaboration with my heads of department and their 
staff.  In practice, they will each ‘own’ different elements of the public engagement 
strategy. We will review each of those activities in order to understand what’s going 
on, whether we are performing in a way that we want to, etc. Ultimately, I then have 
to report that to the Executive Board who will then report to the trustees, and there is 
a whole suite of processes that are in place to enable us deliver those strategies.  For 
example, we have a ‘commercial task force’ that deals with commercial income, we 
have a ‘content strategy board’ that sets the content of the public programme, we have 
a ‘public engagement programme board’ that governs our projects.  
 
In contrast to the strategic plan which spanned a decade and articulated the board of 
trustees’ and the museum director’s strategic priorities, the arts organisations prepared an 
annual business plan to articulate the operational activities that departmental managers and 
individuals intend to undertake in the pursuit of long term objectives. Surprisingly, a chief 
curator used the cause-effect vocabulary in the balanced scorecard (Kaplan & Norton, 2001) 
as follows: “Every individual has a performance development plan, where personal 
objectives are informed by the departmental objectives and linked to the museum’s business 
plan for the next twelve months”. 
DCMS did not interfere with operational matters which were the responsibility of the 
executives. However, it was involved in making senior appointments and dealing with 
administrative and strategic matters through a ‘bureaucratic chain’. There was an element of 
trust between DCMS and the arts organisations (ter Bogt & Tillema, 2016), as apprehended 
from our interview with a director of development from the museum:  
 
To a large extent, DCMS just let us get on with our work. They can directly contact 
our trustees if they have a problem regarding the things that we do. But they actually 
know what we are doing, because we articulate what we do clearly, we report to them 
every quarter, so there is a bureaucratic chain. To some extent there is an element of 
trust. Where they flex their muscle, is on the appointment of board of trustees and 
chairman. Regarding day to day operations, they are flexible. 
 
However, it would be naïve to think that DCMS does not indirectly influence operational 
activities. This is because the long-term strategic plan of the chairman of the board of 
trustees and the museum director which informs the operational matters in the annual 
business plans is itself based on the management agreement which focusses on the strategic 
priorities of the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sports. As stated by the chairman 
and museum director in the strategic plan “the  priorities and goals in Inspiring Futures will 
be reflected in Annual Plans from 2017/18, which will set out specific actions and 
deliverables…This overarching strategic framework will also inform the subject-specific 
strategies and plans that are produced from time to time.” (Museum, 2017, p. 38).  
In summary, the management agreement, strategic framework, and business plans 
have penetrated the departmental boundaries of arts organisations to shape values of the 
different teams working to pursue common objectives. These documents contain private 
sector performance management vocabularies which have entrenched arts organisations. 
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Performance measurement, evaluation and consequences 
Performance was evaluated externally in relation to the management agreement signed by 
the board of trustees, the museum director and the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and 
Sports, and internally in relation to the annual plan and the strategic plan.  
The external monitoring process is aimed at enabling DCMS discharge its 
parliamentary accountability for using taxpayers’ money. DCMS provides official statistics 
of the arts organisations they sponsor and delegate the responsibility of compiling 
performance indicators to the chairman of the board of trustees and museum director who 
are required to follow the DCMS’s ‘Performance Indicator Guidance Document’ (DCMS, 
2017b). However, a director of engagement from a museum argued that they should not be 
judged on the basis of generic KPIs: 
 
The KPIs are simplistic and don’t reflect our strengths as a scientific research 
institute – we have many scientists who produce scientific knowledge as compared to 
other museums who don’t. We are different, yet we are judged on the basis of generic 
KPIs, alongside others. 
 
However, the external KPIs were used symbolically to loosely manage performance. No 
targets were assigned and there were no financial consequences: The management 
agreement does not say: ‘we will give you x if you achieve y in terms of performance’ 
(Deputy CEO, arts gallery).   
The feedback loop from DCMS to the arts organisations was weak. As pointed out by 
a director of public engagement from the arts gallery: 
 
We sign the management agreement with DCMS at the beginning of every four years, 
telling us what the grant-in aid is going to be and what KPIs we must report on, but 
the document don’t ever get referred to again…The information just literally goes into 
a black hole and nobody sees it again. 
 
Some interviewees commented that lack of feedback was the result of downsizing of the 
museum team in DCMS which affected its ability to effectively engage with the arts 
organisations. As pointed out by a trustee: ‘DCMS itself was not spared from the funding 
cuts’. The UK government has reduced the number of key performance indicators (KPIs) 
from 12 to 3 (i.e. visitor numbers, philanthropic income, and items on loans) to reduce the 
administrative burden of data collection and analysis (DCMS, 2017b), and in response to the 
widespread criticisms of the use of performance targets in the arts sector “which can act as 
millstones around the neck of creativity” (McMaster, 2008, p. 4).  
Unsurprisingly, interviewees highlighted that their internal KPIs were more helpful 
than DCMS’s generic KPIs. A director from the museum provided the following examples 
of qualitative issues they monitor using internal KPIs: “visitor satisfaction, number and 
quality of our publications, number of publications in top ranked journals, self-generated 
income, and number of scientist visiting and using our collection for research purposes”. 
However, he admitted that other factors such as “what visitors take away from the museum, 
in terms of understanding and inspiration to become scientist” are difficult to capture.  A 
bottom-up approach was followed when designing these KPIs i.e. they were discursively 
agreed by the departmental directors and their teams, tailored to capture heterogeneous 
objectives and critical success areas, and used diagnostically as traffic lights to signal 
progress towards achieving strategic objectives (Simons, 1995).   A director of finance and 
planning from the arts gallery explained that:  
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We use a range of KPIs, as in a traffic light system, to measure our progress, and 
what we hope to achieve, by way of activities. Our progress is not only measured 
against the KPIs, but is also measured against whether we deliver the things that we 
expected to deliver, and if we didn’t, why not? My reporting to the trustees is a 
combination of the KPIs and activities, which they find helpful. 
 
Evaluation processes not only created knowledge about activities and performance to enable 
the steering of organisational activities, but also enabled self-reflection and learning. As 
commented by a director of public engagement:  
 
We don’t set internal KPIs for the fun of it - I mean we really use them. I have about 
half a dozen KPIs for my public engagement strategy which I feel are fundamental for 
me to know how we are doing, and whether we are moving in the right direction.  For 
example, we segment our market into two or three segments and use a KPI to measure 
our engagement with the target audiences or segments. Currently we are engaging 
31% with a particular segment but by 2018 we want to increase our engagement to 
35%.  That KPI is a meaningful measure which is linked to the objectives in our 
strategy document, such as fund raising or engagement with a minority group, or 
inspiring people.   
 
DCMS loosely monitored the performance of arts organisations at a distance, whilst tightly 
specifying the ground rules that arts organisations should follow to demonstrate value for 
money. Internal performance evaluation processes were praised for their emancipatory 
potential of enabling discrete organisational units evaluate the effectiveness of their 
activities when pursuing heterogeneous objectives.  
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
This study has provided insights into the complex influences that shape the PMSs of 
national arts organisations. PMSs were primarily designed to enable trustees discharge their 
statutory duties of collecting, preserving, and displaying objects and works of arts, which 
were reflected in the management agreement containing the government’s strategic 
priorities, such as fostering interest in science, technology engineering and mathematics 
(STEM), creating cohesion among the population and reaching specific groups such as 
ethnic minorities, women and young people (DCMS, 2017a). PMSs of arts organisations 
were also influenced by changes in political and economic climate, and reflected the efforts 
of trustees and executives at interpreting and responding to these changes in their strategic 
plans and operational activities. 
Dependence on funding is a major source of influence (ter Bogt & Tillema, 2016). In 
return for public funding, arts organisations are required to contribute to the strategic 
priorities of the Secretary of State of Culture, Media and Sports. The latter is politically 
accountable to the Cabinet Office and the Parliament for obtaining value for money in the 
pursuit of policy objectives. In line with the NPM ideology of distancing politicians from 
service delivery to make managers accountable for results (Hood, 1995), national arts 
organisations are organised as NDPBs to provide them with immunity from political 
interference. However, the government was able to obtain action at arm’s length through 
two main governance technologies which were hierarchical in nature: control over the 
appointment of trustees and museum directors, and the management agreement. DCMS was 
primarily concerned with financial reporting, policy priorities and administrative matters. 
Despite the financial and administrative focus aimed at increasing transparency, DCMS 
could not effectively assimilate the information produced by arts organisations and 
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effectively engage with them because DCMS itself was not spared from the funding cuts. 
This lack of feedback unsurprisingly created the impression that the information was going 
into a blackhole. Nevertheless, DCMS intervened to over-ride an important strategic 
decision taken by the museum’s executives to close one of its branches due to funding cuts 
and falling visitor numbers, because the political implication of the closure outweighed the 
financial implication.  
The findings illustrate the power of governance technologies in transcending 
organisational and departmental boundaries to shape values and create identities through 
learning and reflection. Whilst accounting technologies, such as PMSs and strategic plans, 
are designed to communicate a reality by rendering things visible, they have the potential to 
create a reality of the things that are most valued by influential groups. For example, 
management agreement drove the long-term strategic and short-term business plans and 
made ‘core’ and ‘support’ strategic themes visible. These documents played a pedagogic 
role in creating knowledge to enable organisational steering and learning (Oakes , et al., 
1998). Heads of departments and individuals identified with the themes and objectives 
inscribed in strategic and business plans, and aligned their operational activities to pursue 
the strategic themes emphasised by senior management.  
Generic KPIs have the tendency to standardise and homogenise. Whilst the 
appropriateness and usefulness of KPIs have been blanketly questioned in the literature 
(Oakes & Oakes, 2016), this study distinguishes between generic and specific KPIs and 
highlights the purposes they serve. Generic KPIs, which were reduced from 12 to 3, were 
symbolically used to demonstrate contributions of arts organisations to DCMS’s priorities, 
whilst providing autonomy to arts organisations to differentiate themselves. Generic KPIs 
were used because it is difficult to precisely define and measure the outputs and outcomes of 
different arts organisations by designing specific KPIs, which would have further hindered 
managerial discretion and increased administrative burdens. Interviewees devised their own 
specific KPIs to capture information of interest to them, but admitted that not all 
information can be captured by performance measures.  
The implications of austerity should be carefully assessed by the government, because 
of its potential to change accountability structures, displace socio-cultural values, and 
change identities. Austerity and the government’s funding cuts pressured arts organisations 
to find alternative sources of funding to support their core activities. Competition has 
intensified among arts organisations who are competing for the same pot of funding which 
has reduced. Interviewees highlighted that they are placing greater emphasis on fundraising 
and moving towards a US model of funding their activities through donations and 
commercial activities, although they are unable to charge for access to their general 
collections as part of the condition of the grant-in aid from DCMS. However, a significant 
increase in the proportion of non-government funding to total funding may require a 
reconfiguration of the current governance structure which prioritises accountability to the 
government.   
External pressures arising from austerity resulted in the emphasising of politico-
economic values and the subtle displacement of socio-cultural values, which may be 
counterproductive to the government’s own policy initiatives of, for example, widening 
citizens’ participation in the arts sector. The pursuit of market solutions to the problem of 
austerity may marginalise certain groups and change values, as arts organisations are 
tempted to attract visitors who are more likely to spend, put-up special exhibits for which 
visitors have to pay to gain access, use scarce space for commercial activities, and  cut costs 
by reducing the number of engagement projects they undertake (Oakes & Oakes, 2016). The 
focus on economic objectives (e.g. fundraising activities) may conflict with social-cultural 
objectives, in the deployment of scarce managerial time and space resources.  
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External politico-economic pressures arising from austerity and the financial crisis 
helped to inculcate new vocabularies to reconfigure identities. The language, vocabularies, 
and tools commonly used in the private sector (such as strategic and business plans 
containing mission, strategies, SMART goals, cause-effect relationships, profit, and income-
generating activities) were insidiously taking root in the arts sector (Mikes & Morhart, 
2017). Reliance was placed on private sector “external experts who advised, guided and 
challenged” arts organisations in the preparation of strategic and business plans that provide 
the overarching framework for governing arts and culture (Museum, 2017, p. 5). This 
strategic document, prepared by financial expert, created visibilities on strategic themes that 
formed the basis for operational action by executives and their teams. Austerity provided a 
signal to executives that they have to embrace these vocabularies to support their core 
activities, the survival of which were at stake. 
The government’s austerity discourse has brought changes that are subtly redefining 
the field of arts and culture. Arts organisations share some complicity in the process of 
changing their values by implementing externally imposed imperatives in the guise of 
austerity that may threaten the production of cultural goods. Managers were complicit in 
their own control, by accepting the government’s austerity agenda and adopting PMS 
modelled on the private sector to change their practices, identities and what they value in the 
field of arts. Whilst funding is required to support the pursuit of socio-cultural objectives, 
arts organisations do not necessarily have to engage in fundraising and commercial 
activities, which may become a core activity and an end in themselves, to support arts and 
culture if these are truly public good. 
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